Effects of Financial Capital on Colombian Banking Efficiency by Dairo Estrada & Poldy Osorio
E®ects of Financial Capital on








In this paper we discuss cost and pro¯t e±ciency for a sample of
¯nancial institutions on the Colombian ¯nancial market in the period
1989-2003, using stochastic frontier e±ciency analysis. During the pe-
riod, the cost e±cient frontier deteriorates, but pro¯t e±cient frontier
is relatively stable. We found signi¯cant di®erence when we compare
the e±ciency scores between types of ¯nancial intermediaries. Addi-
tionally, our analysis show that the scores for pro¯t and cost e±ciency
have di®erent distribution. We found big di®erences between pro¯t
and cost e±ciency among the di®erent type banks. This is evidence
in favor of some banks behaving collusively and capturing oligopoly
rents.
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11 Introduction
In the last years, there have been a series of changes related to global trends
in the supply of ¯nancial services. These trends include economic integration,
technological change, increased competition, disintermediation, deregulation
and ¯nancial crises 1. Colombia has not been apart from this phenomenon
and its ¯nancial market is assumed to have led to increase in competition
during the last years. In this way, both from banks and non-bank ¯nancial
institutions, cost e±ciency becomes a prerequisite for survival. The e±ciency
analysis is a leading indicator of how the ¯nancial ¯rms adopt some strategies
to face the consolidation process.
With e±ciency analysis we can study the e®ects of the liberalization,
distinguishing between cost and pro¯t analysis. We use the stochastic frontier
analysis (SFA) to identify the di®erent level of ine±ciency for each ¯nancial
¯rm. It yields a best practice frontier as well as individual ¯rm performance
measures benchmarked against this frontier. We apply the analysis to a
sample of ¯nancial ¯rms of the Colombian ¯nancial system in the period 1989-
2003. During this period changes occurred in the Colombian ¯nancial system
originated by a ¯nancial crises, deregulation and consolidation processes.
We analyze the e±ciency with cost and pro¯t functions using variables
such as ¯nancial capital and linear and quadratic trend term to determine
whether shifts in the e±cient cost and pro¯t frontiers occur. In addition, we
check for trend changes in average cost e±ciency and average pro¯t e±ciency
between 1989-2003. We conclude that the cost and pro¯t e±ciency are di®er-
ent with respect to the levels for each type of ¯nancial ¯rm and with respect
to the evolution during the period. Pro¯t e±ciency was approximately con-
stant while the cost e±ciency showed a signi¯cant change during the period.
To ¯nd di®erences amongst ¯nancial institutions, we test equality between
cost and pro¯t e±ciency for the di®erent types of ¯nancial institutions, ac-
cording to the traditional division of the Colombian ¯nancial system. The
results show di®erent levels in the cost and pro¯t e±ciency, suggesting that
some banks bene¯t from sheer size and market power in the ¯nancial system.
This is an evidence in favor of some banks behaving collusively and capturing
oligopoly rents.
Additionally, in this paper we ¯nd that the incorporation of the ¯nan-
cial capital as a control variable is relevant to measure the cost and pro¯t
1For an overview see Berger (1998).
2e±ciency.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, a general
review of the literature to model inputs and outputs for the ¯nancial ¯rm and
the role of the ¯nancial capital. Next, in section 3 we present the translog
function to estimate the e±ciency measures. The section 4 show the empirical
evidence for the Colombian case. The section 5 presents the estimation
results. We conclude in section 6.
2 Production Function
2.1 Inputs and outputs for the ¯nancial institution
Actually, there is a wide debate on the accurate speci¯cation of the produc-
tion function. We can distinguish two alternative approaches, on the one
hand, the production approach distinguishes labor and physical capital as
inputs to be combined to obtain outputs measured as credit and deposit
transactions 2. On the other hand, the intermediation approach starts from
the traditional core function of ¯nancial institutions and takes deposits as
inputs and de¯nes loans and investments as outputs. This approach has been
widely used in the literature: Benston, Hanweck and Humphrey (1982), Mur-
ray and White (1983) and Mester (1987) 3. Some authors such as Hancock
(1991) and Hughes, Mester, and Moon (2000), do not establish a priori if the
deposits transactions are inputs or outputs in the production function. They
use a regression for the pro¯t function, using di®erent variables that must be
checked as input and output. In their empirical exploration for US ¯nancial
institutions, they found that credit and deposit transactions are outputs in
the estimated pro¯t function.
2.2 The role of the ¯nancial capital
In this paper, we incorporate the ¯nancial capital to measure the e®ects re-
lated with risk and information management on the e±ciency of the ¯nancial
2See Ferrier and Lovell (1990). This approach had been used recently analyzing branch
bank behavior, in which there is no total dependency between the intermediation strate-
gies.
3There are another approaches, that pretend to compute speci¯cally another roles of
¯nancial institutions, such as risk administration, information management and/or agency
problems.
3institutions. Note that the approaches mentioned previously fail to incorpo-
rate all the aspects of risk, information processing and the solution of agency
problems arising from the di®erences between loans and deposits and from
the separation between management and ownership. Potential solutions to
the shortcomings could be a di®erent formulation of the constraints under
which banks solve their minimization and maximization problems respec-
tively. Berger and Mester (1997) argue that a bank's insolvency risk depends
on its ¯nancial capital available to absorb portfolio losses, as well as on the
portfolio risks themselves. Insolvency risk a®ects the cost and pro¯t struc-
ture via the risk premium on uninsured debt, and through the intensity of
risk management activities the bank undertakes.
Apart from risk, a bank's capital level directly a®ects cost by providing an
alternative funding resource for assets. Interest paid on deposits represents a
cost, but dividends paid do not. On the other hand, raising equity typically
involves higher costs than raising deposits. In this way, banks with di®erent
relation equity/deposits can see modi¯ed their cost and pro¯t structure. In
some cases, large banks depend more on deposits funding to ¯nance their
portfolios than small banks do, so a failure to control for equity could yield
a scale bias 4.
Additionally, if we consider the size of the assets, banks with lower risk
positions can choose to set higher capitalization levels to send good signals.
While banks with low capital level and higher risk position cannot imitate
those actions given the opportunity cost incurred by having additional capital
position. These kind of banks need to have riskier assets that are compen-
sated with higher interest rate to alleviate higher variance and risk level. The
speci¯cation of the capital in the cost and pro¯t function also goes part of
the di®erent risk preferences of banks. If the banks are more risk averse than
others, they may hold a higher level of ¯nancial capital to maximize pro¯ts
or minimize cost. If ¯nancial capital is ignored, the e±ciency of these banks
would be mismeasured, even though they behave optimally given their risk
preferences.
The ¯nancial ¯rms combine inputs such as labor, physical capital and
¯nancial capital (equity and/or debt) to o®er certain outputs: loans, invest-
ments and o®-balance-sheet operations. The production process for these
assets and products involves collecting relevant information, taking credit
4For a brief summary describing the role of ¯nancial capital within the ¯nancial tech-
nology see Lucas and McDonald (1992) and Hughes and Mester (1998).
4risk positions, monitoring activities, and relationships between managers,
owners and borrowers. Banks that are more e±cient at accomplishing these
tasks expect a higher return and a lower variance of return on individual
loans. Hence, banks that are more e±cient producers can reduce both the
systematic and idiosyncratic components of an individual risk's total variance
through better credit assessment, contract writing, and monitoring. Unlike
individual investors, banks can in°uence the magnitude of an individual as-
set's systematic risk. When loans are combined in banks' portfolios, more
e±cient banks can expect a lower variance for any given return on their
portfolios. Thus, capital markets price this e±ciency.
Most of the literature about ¯nancial e±ciency has ignored the role of
¯nancial capital to estimate bank e±ciency. The ¯nancial capital is a source
of resources to ¯nance loans and other assets and it serves as instrument to
protect banks against ¯nancial crises and as we mentioned before, it serves
as a signal to the agents about bank's credit and management risk position.
Banks that ¯nance their assets with a lower proportion capital-deposits, need
more liabilities and then a higher insolvency risk, ceteris paribus.
Hughes, Mester and Moon (2000) try to solve the following question: how
is the cost of equity capital taken into account in computing e±ciency? They
formulate the answer by conditioning the minimum cost on the level of equity
capital and computing equity capital's shadow price from this conditional
optimum. In the same way, we compute the optimization problem of the
banks taking in account the cost and pro¯t functions both conditioned by
the ¯nancial capital.
Now, we will do a brief description of the two optimization problems,
considering a ¯nancial technology that is represented according with the
function F(y;x;z) · 0 where y denotes di®erent assets such as information-
intensive loans, ¯nancial interbank services, and other investments; x = xd+
xp, denotes the level of inputs; xd representing deposits, xp denoting labor
and physical capital and z, denotes equity capital. The prices for each inputs
are denoted by wi. The economic cost of producing the output vector y is
given by wdxd+wpxp+wzz, omitting the cost of equity capital, the function
cost is denominated cash-°ow cost and is represented as wdxd + wpxp.
2.3 Bank Production, Cost and Pro¯t
Here, we summarize the main aspects related with the intermediation ap-
proach, widely used in the literature. Based on the minimization cost and
5pro¯t maximization methods, we evaluate e±ciency with respect to certain
objective function. In the ¯rst case, the ine±ciency is caused by suboptimal
choices of used inputs, given input prices, output quantities and available ¯-
nancial capital. In the second case, the pro¯t-ine±ciency measures foregone
pro¯ts due to a suboptimal choice of output quantities given output prices (or
suboptimal output prices given quantities). In perfectly competitive markets,
the two approaches could yield identical results ¯xing the output quantity.
However, in the case of imperfect competition, market power might lead to
a pro¯t e±cient bank that is ine±cient in terms of cost or viceversa. The
combined use of cost minimization problem and pro¯t maximization problem
will therefore shed light on the character of ine±ciencies. Using the same no-
tation of the previous subsection, we present the two mentioned approaches.
2.4 Cost Minimization
The minimization problem is set up as follows. Based in Hughes et. al.
(2000), we consider a function C(:) consisting of the cost incurred due to
buying input quantities x at price w. We distinguish three alternative cost
functions: operating cost function, cash °ow cost function and economic cost
function.
Given a deposits level xd and a ¯nancial capital level z, the operating cost
function Cp(y;wp;xp;x0
d;z0) is de¯ned by:
Minxp = w
0




The operating cost function considers capital structure by conditioning
cost on the levels of ¯nancial capital while excludes their expense from the
cost function. Deposits and ¯nancial capital are taken as given.
A cash-°ow measure of cost Ccf(y;wp;wd;z0) includes the cost of deposits






dxd s:t: F(x;y;z) · 0; z = z
0 (2.2)
The level of deposits minimizes cost while cost is conditioned on the
level of ¯nancial capital. Hence, the level of equity capital does not have
to minimize cost. This formulation accounts for capitalization but does not
require a price for ¯nancial capital.
6In contrast, the minimum economic cost function Ce(y;wi) is conditioned
on the price of ¯nancial capital rather than on the quantity and, hence, the





dxd + wzz s:t: F(x;y;z) · 0 (2.3)
While these three formulations of cost incorporate ¯nancial capital's in-
°uence on production, many bank cost studies omit any role of ¯nancial





dxd s:t: F(x;y;z) · 0 (2.4)
The di®erences among these four formulations of cost are important. The
last expression is very similar to (2.3) but does not consider z. The di®erences
between (2.2)-(2.4) are important, given that in the last equation we don't
consider ¯nancial capital, when this variable changes, the equation (2.4) does
not capture those variations in the cost functions.
If there are two banks with di®erent capital-deposits ratio. Given (2.4),
the bank with lowest capital appears with a higher cash °ow cost compared
with the other bank. As we mentioned before, the level of ¯nancial capital
e®ects the risk position of banks and the incurred costs managing risk. A
speci¯cation likes (2.4) does not take in account these kind of decisions of
the banks and then, it can generate wrong conclusions when we evaluate
e±ciency in the cost function for the banks with di®erent capitalization level.







Taking ¯st derivatives and solving yields the conditional factor demand












i(y;w;z) = e c(y;w;z) (2.5)
The conditional demand for inputs depends on the amount of output
sold prevailing prices, the given factor prices in input markets and the level
of capital in the production period.
72.5 Pro¯t Maximization
Like the minimization cost problem, we can deduce the maximization prob-
lem. When we assume that the market is perfectly competitive in inputs and
outputs, in which banks choose optimal quantities of inputs and outputs,




0x s.t. F(y;x) = 0 (2.6)
With F(y;x) is the transformation function of the factors vector x to
outputs vector y. The Lagrangian system can be written as:
Ã L = p
0y ¡ w
0x ¡ ¸F(:)














The problem related with this approach is associated with the assumption
of perfect competition among banks. It could be a unrealistic assumption.
Following Humphrey and Pulley (1997) and Bos and Kool (2001), we modify
the pro¯t function and permit banks to exercise a form of market power in
choosing output prices. This market power is limited to output markets;
banks remain competitive purchasers of inputs 5.
WE assume that banks maximize pro¯ts for a given output quantities, y,
and input prices w, by choosing output prices p, along with input quantities,
x. The associated indirect pro¯t function is derived as the solution to the
problem:
5In practice, banks exploit local market power for certain deposit and loan services and
have the ability to di®erentiate output prices among customer groups, across geographic
areas, and over time.
8Maxp;x = p
0y ¡ w
0x s.t. F(y;x) = 0 and G(y;p;w;z) = 0 (2.8)
Where G(y;p;w;z) represents a bank's pricing opportunity set for trans-
forming given values of y, w and z into output prices. This re°ects the bank's
assessment of the willingness of customers to pay the prices the bank wishes
to charge. The function G(:) also re°ects any conjetural variations incorpo-
rated in pricing rules the bank may follow, such as di®erentiability marking
up the cost of funds; hence the inclusion of input prices.
The Lagrangian system can be written as:
Ã L = p
0y ¡ w
0x ¡ ¸F(:) ¡ µG(:)
And the solution give us the optimal choice for output prices p¤ = p¤(y;w;z)













¤(y;w;z) = e ¼(y;w;z) (2.9)
The appealing feature if this pro¯t function is that it allows for market
imperfections on the output side. Additionally, output prices, which are
required to the traditional pro¯t function estimation are not required for the
empirical analysis of the alternative pro¯t function 6.
The next section, presents the functional form to estimate the di®erent
cost and pro¯t systems within the ¯nancial system.
6Berger and Mester (1997) argue that alternative pro¯t function may provide useful
information when one or more of the following conditions a®ect the bank behavior: i. there
are a substantial unmeasured di®erences in the quality of banking services; ii. output are
not completely variable, so that a bank cannot achieve every output scale and product
mix; iii. output market are not completely competitive, then, there are market power;
iv. output prices are not accurately measured, a very common problem for the empirical
analysis.
93 Speci¯cation
For the estimation of cost and alternative pro¯t frontier functions a translog
functional form is chosen with three inputs and three outputs. This form has
been employed widely and has proven to allow for the necessary °exibility
when estimating the frontier function 7.
Berger and Mester (1997) have compared the translog to the Alternative
Fourier Flexible Form. Despite the latter's added °exibility, the di®erence in
results between both methods appears to be negligible. Additionally, given
the larger number of parameters in the second functional form, we avoid its
implementation, since we don't have enough data set. For this reason we
adopt the translog functional form in our analysis. The frontier cost function
for a k bank in the period t is represented by:



























dijlnwiktlnyjkt + Ukt + Vkt
(3.1)
We denoted this 3-input/3-output model as model 1 (M1). Here, Ukt and
Vkt are the ine±ciency and random error terms, respectively. For the pro¯t
function, the left-hand side is replaced with net pro¯ts and the ine±ciency
term is ¡Ukt.
In the model 2 (M2), we incorporate variables related to ¯nancial capital
and its interactions with the explanatory variables to analyze the e®ect of
¯nancial capital on cost and pro¯t functions of the ¯nancial intermediaries.
The new cost function will be:
7Fuss, Mcfadden and Mundlak (1978) describe the di®erent characteristics that must be
considered to choose a functional form and summarize the main functional forms used in
the literature, such as Cobb-Douglas, CES, Leontief/Lineal, Translog, Generalized Cobb-
Douglas, Quadratic, Concave generalized.













To allow for the impact of consolidation and deregulation on the e±cient
frontier, we alternatively include a linear and quadratic trend term as well
as trend. These will be referred to as model 3 (M3) 8:





The alternative pro¯t function for each model is similar except for the
before-mentioned modi¯cations:



























dijlnwiktlnyjkt + Ukt + Vkt
(3.4)
Following Lang and Welzel (1999), to ensure symmetry and linear homo-
geneity in input prices, we impose the usual restrictions:






bij = 0 8i;
3 X
i=1








8A negative number and signi¯cant statistically of the parameter t , indicate us a multi-
factor productivity growth. Obviously, these trend terms may capture pure technological
change as well as e®ects of consolidation and deregulation jointly. We are not able to
determine the relative contribution of each factor separately.
11In the empirical estimation, linear homogeneity in input prices is imposed
by normalizing the dependent variable (total cost or pro¯t) and all factor
price variables (wi) before taking logarithms 9. Each one of the variables is
included as a ratio relative to one of the factor price variables. Note that this
imposes homogeneity of degree one in factor prices only 10. Therefore, this
implies that only two coe±cients (bi) for the input factor price variables are
obtained, while the third can be inferred from the imposed restriction. The
random error term Vkt is assumed i.i.d. with Vkt » N(0;¾2
V) and represents
those shocks that are not directly controlled by the ¯nancial intermediaries
and it is assumed to be independently of the explanatory variables 11.
The ine±ciency term Ukt is i.i.d. with Uk » N(¹;¾2
U) and is independent
of Vkt. It is drawn from a non-negative distribution truncated in ¹ instead
than in zero 12.
For the cost model, let Ekt = Vkt + Ukt. The speci¯c cost e±ciency
estimation of a bank k at time t is given by the mean of the conditional
distribution of Ukt given Ekt, de¯ned as:
EFFkt(e c) = E[exp(Ukt)jEkt]
This measure takes values in the interval (1;1). Values equal to one
mean fully e±cient. Values close to one, indicate that e±ciency on bank's
cost, conditional on its outputs, input prices and capital level, is above of
the cost that fully e±cient bank could incur under the same conditions. For
the pro¯t function, Ekt = Vkt ¡ Ukt. Firm speci¯c pro¯t e±ciency is again
the mean of the conditional distribution of Ukt given Ekt, and is de¯ned as:
EFFkt(e ¼) = E[exp(¡Ukt)jEkt]
9See Coelli et al. (1998)
10To impose constant returns to scale, normalization of the output variables would be
required too.
11See Aigner et al. (1977) and Coelli (1996).
12Coelli et al. (1998) argue that the truncated distribution is a generalization of the half-
normal distribution. It is obtained by the truncation at zero of the normal distribution
with mean, ¹, and variance ¾2. If ¹ is pre-assigned to be zero, then the distribution is the
half-normal. The distribution may take a variety of shapes, depending on the size and sign
of ¹. The estimation of the truncated-normal stochastic frontier involves the estimation
of the parameter, ¹, together with the other parameters of the model. The log-likelihood
function required for the Maximum-Likelihood (ML) estimation of the parameters of the
model was ¯rst given by Stevenson (1980). Expressions for appropriate predictors of the
technical e±ciencies of ¯rms were given in Battese and Coelli (1988).
12which takes values on the interval (0;1), where 1 indicates a fully e±cient
¯nancial intermediary.
The frontier functions are estimated through ML methods. For this pur-
pose we used the computer program FRONTIER 4.1 by ? 13. Following
Coelli (1996), the terms ¾2
U and ¾2






V) 14. The parameter ° represents the share of ine±ciency
in the overall residual variance with values in the interval [0;1]. A value of 1
suggests the existence of a deterministic frontier, whereas a value of 0 can be
seen as evidence in favor of a standard OLS estimation. In the latter case,
no structural ine±ciency exists.
4 Empirical Evidence
4.1 Colombian Banking Sector
Table (1) illustrates the di®erent papers related with the Colombian banking
sector e±ciency. We can say that the empirical evidence is not enough given
the lag in the considered period and the methodology used in the estimations.
Another limitation is that the results just apply for one type of ¯nancial
intermediary. In this paper, we consider a period of time between 1989 and
2003 and the majority of ¯nancial institutions of the Colombian banking
sector.
4.2 The data
We extend the data set of the previous papers considering a wider period.
Our analysis period runs from the ¯rst quarter of 1989 to the third quarter of
2003. Additionally, we incorporate the di®erent types of Colombian ¯nancial
institutions jointly: comercial banks, specialized mortgage loan banks 15,
¯nancial corporations (investment banks) and specialized commercial loan
13The computer program FRONTIER 4.1 has been written to provide ML estimates of
a wide variety of stochastic frontier production and cost functions.
14The log-likelihood function for this stochastic frontier and ine±ciency model is pre-
sented in the appendix in Battese and Coelli (1993), together with the ¯rst partial deriva-
tives of the log-likelihood function with respect to the di®erent parameters of the model.
15Since 1997, these institutions are transformed from saving and loan banks to special-
ized mortgage loan banks.
13Table 1: Colombian Bank E±ciency Literature
Date Author Period Method a Institution
Typeb
1996 Misas y Suesc¶ un 1989-1995 TFA CB
2000 Mendoza 1996-1999 DEA CB
2001 Castro 1994-1999 DFA CB
2002 Badel 1998-2000 DFA CB
2003 Janna 1992-2002 SFA CB
a DEA:Data Envelopment Analysis, DFA: Distribution Free Approach, SFA: Stochastic Frontier Anal-
ysis, TFA: Thick Frontier Analysis. b CB: Comercial Bank.
Table 2: Colombian Financial Institutions: 2003 a
Public Private Foreign Total
Banks Banks Banks
Commercial Banks 3 10 9 22
Mortgage Loan Banks 1 5 0 6
Financial Corporations 1 4 0 5
Commercial Loan Banks 0 10 4 14
Leasing Banks 1 8 2 11
Financial Cooperative Institutions 0 7 0 6
Public Specialized Banks 9 0 0 9
Total 15 44 15 74
a Source: Superintendency of Banks.
14banks. This gives us a general perspective of the bank e±ciency of the
sector.
During the period, the Colombian banking system has been a®ected by
process of deregulation and consolidation. For this reason, the Colombian
¯nancial institutions have reacted to the new market situation. They were
forced to reconsider their strategic options and to restructure 16. Between
1989 and 2003, the ¯nancial sector had 46 mergers, take overs and transfor-
mations. Additionally, at the beginning of the 90's, the Colombian ¯nancial
system was a®ected by an internationalization process with the incorporation
of foreign banks, principally Spanish like BBVA and Santander. In 1998, 14
foreign banks existed, but now, there are only 9 foreign banks .
After the consolidation process of the 90's decade, the ¯nancial sector
had 74 ¯nancial intermediaries divided in 22 commercial banks, 6 specialized
mortgage loan banks, 5 ¯nancial corporation (investment banks), 14 special-
ized commercial loan banks, 7 ¯nancial cooperative institutions, 11 leasing
¯nancial ¯rms and 9 public specialized ¯nancial institutions. Table (2) shows
the composition by sectors of the ¯nancial institutions for 2003.
We use data set provided by the Colombian superintendency of banks.
For each year, we include only those banks for which all variables are avail-
able. This leaves us with a non-balanced panel, of 57 periods and 5326
observations17.
4.3 Selection Variables
We identify three outputs: loans (y1) is the total stock of all loans supplied,
investments (y2) is the sum of total securities, equity investments, bond (pri-
vate and public) investments and other investments. The third output is
deposits held with other banks (y3). As explained before and in line with
Hughes and Mester (1993), we include (z) as a control variable 18.
Finally, we identify three input prices. The price of ¯nancial capital
(w1), expressed in percentage and computed as: (interest expense/customer
16The data set includes in 1989 84 ¯nancial institutions (33 commercial banks and
specialized mortgage loan banks, 22 ¯nancial corporations and 30 specialized commercial
loan banks).
17The included ¯nancial intermediaries in the sample represent more than 96% of the
total assets of the Colombian ¯nancial sector during the period 1989-I to 2003-I.
18This variable includes social capital, earnings, reserves and banks's funds with speci¯c
destination.
15and short-term funding+other funding)*100. Next, we compute the price of
labor (w2). Unfortunately, the information about the number of employees of
banks is not complete. Therefore, we approximate the number of employees
as follows: we assume a constant relationship between number of employees
and ¯xed assets. For all banks in the Colombian sector, for which we have
information about the number of employees, we regress the logarithm of the
number of employees on the logarithm of ¯xed assets 19.
This result is used to estimate the number of employees for all banks. Our
proxy for the price of labor is then composed as follows: Personnel Expenses
/ Estimated number of Employees.
The price of physical capital (w3) 20 is: Administrative fees / Fixed assets.
Before the estimations, we divide pro¯t before tax PBT, total cost TC,
w1 and w2 by w3, the physical-capital price, to impose input-price lineal
homogeneity.
In table (3), we present a few summary statistics for the variables in-
volved. All quantity variables are expressed in millions of Pesos and cor-
rected for in°ation 21. The explanatory variables are (PBT) and (TC). Both
are taken from the banks's pro¯t and loss account, where the latter is the
sum of interest expenses, personnel expenses and other operating expenses.
In the period 1989-2003, the commercial banks present a higher level of
dispersion in the analyzed variables 22. Based on table (3), the banks have,
in real terms, the higher levels of cost and pro¯ts, but with higher dispersion,
too. It can be veri¯ed when we consider the mean and median value for each
variable.
The analysis of the outputs data, shows us signi¯cant di®erences between
the di®erent types of ¯nancial intermediaries. The commercial banks (CB)
19The rest of employees data were estimated using a regression between the number of
employees and ¯xed assets:
ln(employees) = ¡1:983 + 0:945 ¤ ln(¯xed assets)-0.0478*t
(0:23) (0:024) (0:002)
with R2 = 0:787. Standard Error in parenthesis.
20Administrative fees includes those fees di®erent from personnel fees: operating indirect
cost, depreciation and amortizations. Fixed assets include own used goods and another
assets.
21We used the CPI, 100=dec/98.
22From now on, we denote banks as the sum of commercial banks and mortgage loan
banks.
16Table 3: Summary Statistics: Millions of Pesos a;b
Variable Max. Min. Mean. Median SD. Asymmetry. Kurtosis.
TOTAL SYSTEM (161)
TC 13208.6 0.3820 344.1 98.6 582.4 4.4 52.3
PBT 10530.2 1.0000 8217.2 8209.5 219.9 -14.3 437.7
y1 40169.4 0.0407 4054.1 1055.4 6579.3 2.3 5.4
y2 22270.7 0.0001 950.4 187.7 2098.4 4.7 29.0
y3 5187.8 0.0031 135.1 25.0 320.5 5.6 47.9
z 12207.5 3.4102 859.4 256.4 1501.6 3.1 11.7
w1 1634.1 0.0087 5.6 5.3 22.7 69.2 4943.7
w2 51940.0 0.9580 535.0 277.3 1161.3 21.0 781.6
w3 10202.2 0.2093 27.5 17.0 156.5 55.1 3433.2
Commercial Banks (49)
TC 5063.8 10.82 755.1 498.2 716.8 1.6 3.3
PBT 9866.2 1.00 8232.5 8235.2 333.1 -11.1 217.6
y1 40169.4 1.32 8882.6 5740.7 8263.3 1.2 0.8
y2 22270.7 1.27 2018.7 1033.4 2909.2 3.4 13.9
y3 5187.8 0.04 302.0 132.7 462.7 3.8 21.8
z 12207.5 68.58 1669.7 870.7 1944.2 2.2 5.3
w1 1634.1 0.59 4.6 3.6 36.4 44.6 1996.1
w2 14060.4 0.96 523.5 348.7 679.4 7.4 110.2
w3 10202.2 0.61 29.5 19.4 229.1 43.8 1942.8
Investment Banks (29)
TC 1986.3 1.57 162.9 83.8 209.4 2.5 8.9
PBT 10530.2 5906.34 8208.5 8207.9 168.8 -2.0 102.5
y1 16258.8 0.14 2551.0 1074.6 3679.9 2.2 3.8
y2 9158.2 0.93 830.0 230.7 1523.4 2.8 8.0
y3 1182.9 0.02 68.6 19.2 146.9 4.1 18.9
z 5430.2 16.62 881.6 289.2 1336.8 2.0 2.7
w1 81.4 0.34 5.6 5.6 3.2 14.9 319.6
w2 7790.3 2.02 327.4 185.1 503.3 5.8 57.6
w3 387.6 0.21 18.4 11.6 24.8 5.6 56.4
Specialized Commercial Loan Banks (83)
TC 13208.6 0.3820 66.4 39.5 281.7 44.3 2063.5
PBT 10343.7 7989.62 8207.8 8206.3 48.0 38.3 1712.1
y1 29925.8 0.0407 511.5 213.7 925.2 15.0 446.1
y2 4371.9 0.0001 71.7 38.5 125.6 18.3 599.9
y3 1721.6 0.0031 19.1 8.2 45.6 23.6 846.3
z 8217.4 3.4102 142.2 92.2 212.0 24.5 917.5
w1 197.2 0.0087 6.4 6.3 5.8 24.8 738.7
w2 51940.0 8.3497 637.7 300.3 1607.0 17.7 486.0
w3 3941.1 0.4348 29.7 16.4 103.5 28.0 962.9
a Source: Bank's Pro¯t and Loss Account and Balance Sheet of Banks.
Superintendency of Banks. Period 1989-2003.
b CT: Total Cost, PBT: Pro¯ts Before Taxes, y1: Credit, y2: Invest-
mets, y3: Deposit in other banks, z: Capital, w1: Financial-Capital
Price, w2: Labor-Price, w3: Physical-Capital Price.
17terms, for all type of intermediaries. The investment banks incremented this
variable in 332%, while commercial banks and specialized commercial banks
incremented its ¯nancial capital 164% and 28% respectively. See table (4).
During the period, the pertinent variables have varied di®erently among
the type on ¯nancial institutions 23. With respect to the cost variable, the
commercial banks presented higher cost levels compared with the another
type of institutions, this behavior is accentuated in crisis period. For the
pro¯t variable, the commercial banks had pro¯t level below the levels of IB
and SCB. However, it is important to emphasize the signi¯cant di®erence
between the mean and median values for the analyzed variables for each
type of intermediaries. It explains the high dispersion among the di®erent
banks, for the CB the dispersion is more accentuated than (IB) and (SCB)
in which the di®erence in dispersion is lower.
5 Estimation Results
We now turn to the empirical analysis. In the next subsection, we show the
estimation of the di®erent models for both, cost and pro¯t translog func-
tions. We test the three models and select one as preferred model and in-
terpret it. We investigate how the consolidation process may change the
estimation results in both the e±cient frontier and estimated mean cost and
pro¯t e±ciency relative to the frontier. In sub-section 5.2 we use the pre-
ferred models to compute individual e±ciency scores. We use the e±ciency
scores for individual ¯nancial institutions to analyze di®erences in e±ciency
between di®erent type of banks.
5.1 Estimated Cost and Pro¯t Frontiers
The detailed estimation results for the di®erent versions of cost and pro¯t
models respectively are presented in tables 5 and 6. We also present both
LR test and LR test (one side) of the standard response function (OLS)
versus full frontier model 24. The LR test results show that we can reject the
23To evaluate the evolution of variables, we have divided the period into three sub-
periods: 1989-I to 1998-III; 1998-IV to 2000-IV (crises period); and 2001-I to 2003-III.
24Kodde and Palm (1986). The null hypothesis in this test is ° = 0 versus the alternative
° > 0.
18Table 4: Summary Statistics: Millions of Pesos a;b
CB IB SCB
Mean SD. Mean SD. Mean SD.
1989-1998
TC 742.3 712.2 140.4 171.6 70.6 320.6
PBT 8270.8 154.6 8222.5 139.6 8209.0 53.6
y1 8073.8 7401.6 2132.6 3059.1 538.2 1010.9
y2 1357.7 1473.1 534.9 1008.0 73.0 137.2
y3 256.6 372.2 52.4 112.1 17.8 49.0
z 1396.1 1633.7 718.1 1235.2 131.6 230.1
w1 4.1 1.4 5.7 2.2 6.8 5.3
w2 311.6 313.8 263.9 313.6 423.9 1035.6
w3 24.3 30.5 18.5 24.9 27.4 105.7
1998-2000
TC 929.2 856.1 294.7 365.1 59.5 65.8
PBT 7997.2 755.7 8114.2 272.3 8198.5 22.0
y1 11444.8 10506.4 4468.3 5717.2 434.7 598.6
y2 2777.8 3391.0 1840.0 2058.9 66.9 81.7
y3 439.7 632.7 148.7 267.3 25.2 35.2
z 2572.5 2697.7 1623.6 1598.8 178.8 139.2
w1 3.8 2.2 4.9 1.8 5.9 4.1
w2 952.0 631.1 598.1 1032.7 996.8 3068.7
w3 23.2 23.6 18.9 29.0 34.6 117.7
2001-2003
TC 626.6 495.2 318.7 241.5 42.0 37.9
PBT 8276.4 164.0 8157.1 280.8 8212.5 13.9
y1 10847.0 9334.1 6389.5 5024.0 416.3 475.0
y2 5222.7 5523.0 3948.4 2759.1 70.8 67.0
y3 420.0 644.7 198.7 222.6 19.5 24.8
z 2290.7 2176.9 2385.2 1157.6 168.7 117.7
w1 8.8 105.8 2.8 0.6 3.8 10.7
w2 1328.9 1287.5 932.1 875.8 1724.2 1567.7
w3 69.2 659.9 19.3 17.2 39.4 41.3
a Source: Bank's Pro¯t and Loss Account and Balance Sheet of Banks.
Superintendency of Banks. Period 1989-2003.
b CB: Commercial Banks, IB: Investment Banks, SCB: Specialized
Comercial Banks.
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restrictions imposed by OLS. Consequently, we use the speci¯cation including
a stochastic ine±ciency term for all models.
With respect to the estimated cost function in table (5), we have that °,
the proportion of ine±ciency in the global residual variance, is signi¯cantly
di®erent from 1, which indicates a stochastic frontier. Also, for our cost model
¹ is signi¯cantly positive with a value of 1.10 in model 3. This means that
the top of the half normal distribution of our ine±ciency term U lies close
to 3, as we can verify in ¯gure (1). Hence, most of our ¯nancial institutions
are relatively cost ine±cient and the average cost ine±ciency is high.
The pro¯t e±ciency results in table (6) show again that ° is signi¯cantly
di®erent from 1 so that e±cient frontier is stochastic. The estimated value
of ¹ changes signi¯cantly between the di®erent models. The impact of a
di®erent value of ¹ can be easily seen from the comparison between the
distribution of cost and pro¯t e±ciency scores in ¯gure (1). In the case of
cost e±ciency, the relatively large value of ¹ indicates that the peak of the
density function of ine±ciency term U is not close to zero. As a result, most
individual e±ciency scores are not close to the full e±ciency value of 1. This
is re°ected in the very °at path of the e±ciency scores. The large negative ¹
for pro¯t function in model 3 implies that the peak of the density function on
ine±ciency terms is far away from zero. Consequently, most individual banks
20Table 5: Estimation Results under Cost Minization a
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coe±cient t-ratio Coe±cient t-ratio Coe±cient t-ratio
Constant -2.3375 -20.70 -3.362 -24.14 -3.405 -23.89
lny1 -0.0348 -1.90 -0.037 -1.54 -0.046 -1.91
lny2 0.2104 11.96 0.261 8.90 0.269 9.23
lny3 0.1525 9.69 0.100 5.25 0.092 4.89
lnw13 0.7755 34.38 0.866 32.98 0.828 30.24
lnw23 0.2568 8.09 0.128 3.73 0.176 4.95
0:5lny1lny1 0.1444 40.25 0.128 32.22 0.128 32.11
0:5lny1lny2 -0.0648 -11.38 -0.021 -3.21 -0.019 -2.95
0:5lny1lny3 -0.0502 -9.89 -0.041 -8.20 -0.039 -7.78
0:5lny2lny2 0.0373 15.36 0.035 12.76 0.035 12.77
0:5lny2lny3 0.0265 5.41 0.057 10.02 0.056 9.71
0:5lny3lny3 0.0009 0.27 -0.004 -1.30 -0.004 -1.37
0:5lnw13lnw13 0.0138 2.48 0.014 2.57 0.008 1.36
0:5lnw23lnw23 0.0114 1.64 0.031 4.15 0.016 2.00
0:5lnw13lnw23 0.0152 1.64 0.011 1.08 0.034 3.07
lnw13lny1 0.0067 1.92 0.008 2.29 0.009 2.66
lnw13lny2 0.0120 3.34 0.017 4.17 0.018 4.54
lnw13lny3 -0.0114 -3.72 -0.009 -2.92 -0.010 -3.09
lnw23lny1 -0.0127 -2.51 -0.003 -0.63 -0.004 -0.71
lnw23lny2 -0.0195 -4.04 0.004 0.67 0.003 0.61
lnw23lny3 -0.0123 -3.53 0.001 0.28 0.002 0.54
lnz 0.461 10.78 0.477 10.70
lnzlnz 0.018 2.57 0.017 2.37
lnw13lnz -0.021 -3.14 -0.022 -3.37
lnw23lnz -0.033 -4.15 -0.033 -4.13
lny1lnz -0.018 -3.08 -0.016 -2.78
lny2lnz -0.054 -8.15 -0.055 -8.41





U 0.479 11.26 0.396 11.92 0.388 11.25
° = ¾2
U=¾2 0.816 64.45 0.796 55.17 0.792 50.29
¹ 1.251 10.52 1.124 10.96 1.109 10.47
LR Test -1495.1 -1244.4 -1232.5
LR Test (1 side) 5097.9 4398.3 4380.8
Iterations 31 38 41
a FRONTIER4.1 program was used for the estimations. 21Table 6: Estimation Results under Pro¯t Maximization a
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coe±cient t-ratio Coe±cient t-ratio Coe±cient t-ratio
Constant 7.848 55.82 7.928 53.03 6.601 54.64
lny1 0.044 2.20 -0.105 -3.87 -0.138 -5.23
lny2 -0.029 -1.51 -0.045 -1.34 -0.039 -1.20
lny3 0.027 1.64 0.017 0.76 -0.026 -1.25
lnw13 1.000 37.99 1.019 34.84 0.858 29.04
lnw23 -0.032 -0.94 -0.047 -1.25 0.164 4.30
0:5lny1lny1 -0.010 -2.68 -0.013 -2.99 -0.009 -2.02
0:5lny1lny2 0.005 0.78 -0.013 -1.86 -0.002 -0.29
0:5lny1lny3 -0.007 -1.33 -0.010 -1.72 -0.006 -1.17
0:5lny2lny2 -0.002 -0.94 0.003 1.05 0.005 1.60
0:5lny2lny3 0.032 6.03 0.030 4.63 0.028 4.46
0:5lny3lny3 -0.013 -3.97 -0.013 -3.69 -0.011 -3.26
0:5lnw13lnw13 0.047 7.89 0.047 7.92 0.020 3.36
0:5lnw23lnw23 0.047 6.38 0.047 5.60 0.011 1.27
0:5lnw13lnw23 -0.132 -12.56 -0.124 -11.31 -0.034 -2.89
lnw13lny1 0.005 1.30 0.004 1.05 0.005 1.22
lnw13lny2 0.000 -0.13 0.000 0.03 0.007 1.53
lnw13lny3 0.000 -0.04 -0.001 -0.20 -0.006 -1.86
lnw23lny1 -0.003 -0.54 -0.003 -0.52 0.010 1.72
lnw23lny2 0.002 0.47 0.007 1.18 0.005 0.91
lnw23lny3 -0.015 -4.14 -0.016 -3.89 -0.012 -3.13
lnz 0.238 4.94 0.410 8.51
lnzlnz -0.060 -7.60 -0.054 -7.08
lnw13lnz -0.005 -0.73 -0.009 -1.29
lnw23lnz 0.002 0.20 -0.019 -2.18
lny1lnz 0.042 6.19 0.033 5.08
lny2lnz 0.010 1.35 0.006 0.79





U 0.255 20.60 0.256 14.33 0.523 6.43
° = ¾2
U=¾2 0.577 24.20 0.598 22.84 0.806 26.45
¹ 0.767 6.78 0.783 8.57 -1.298 -4.57
LR Test -1869.8 -1806.9 -1656.0
LR Test (1 side) 1022.1 1084.6 1030.0
Iterations 34 36 50
a FRONTIER4.1 program was used for the estimations. 22Table 7: Likelihood Ratio Test
Cost Function
Restrictions Test Statistic Â2
0:95-value Decision
Model1;3 9 525.20 16.92 Reject H0
Model2;3 2 23.81 5.99 Reject H0
Model1;2 7 501.39 14.07 Reject H0
Pro¯t Function
Restricciones Estad¶ ³stico Â2
0:95-value Decisi¶ on
Model1;3 9 427.61 16.92 Reject H0
Model2;3 2 301.87 5.99 Reject H0
Model1;2 7 125.74 14.07 Reject H0
are in the tail of the density, leading to wider dispersion in pro¯t e±ciency
than in cost e±ciency.
Table (7) reports likelihood tests for all considered models. For both, cost
and pro¯t frontiers, all restrictions are rejected. Therefore, model 3 is the
preferred for cost and pro¯t functions 25.
Interpretation of the regression coe±cients requires more attention, given
that there are many interrelations between the di®erent explanatory variables
in the translog function. The marginal e®ect of an increase in the loan vari-
able ln(y1) on the respective dependent variables total cost (TC) and before
tax pro¯ts (BTP) must include not only the magnitude of the coe±cient on
ln(y1), but also the combination of all coe±cients on explanatory variables
that include ln(y1). With these caveats in mind, the following holds for the
direct e®ects, excluding the no less important interaction terms.
For cost function, model 3 coe±cients on the output variables have signif-
icant t-value and the coe±cient of ln(y1) has a negative value, representing
scale diseconomies with respect to this output. High ¯nancial capital are
signi¯cantly positively correlated with total cost. The direct e®ect of input
prices is diverse; it is high and signi¯cantly positive (0.828) for the price of
¯nancial capital (w1); low and signi¯cantly positive (0.176) for the price of
labor (w2); and negative (1-0.828-0.176=-0.004) for the price of physical cap-
25Remember that the model 1 corresponds to the estimations of the functions without
taking into account the role of ¯nancial capital and technological change, while model 2
introduce ¯nancial capital, but does not includes trend variables
23ital (w2). The negative coe±cient on (w3) suggests that total cost decrease
with higher physical capital price.
The negative coe±cient on the linear trend term (t) suggest a shifting
cost curve with lower cost (on the frontier through) time. The positive
square trend coe±cient o®sets the linear trend e®ect when time goes on.
From the point estimates on the linear and quadratic trend term we derive
a improvement of the cost function between 1989 and 2003.
For the pro¯t frontier, the model M3 has been chosen. The coe±cients
on the outputs are negative and signi¯cant. Overall, increasing the size of
production leads a lower or pro¯ts, implying diseconomies of scale (again
excluding the interaction e®ects). The coe±cient on ¯nancial capital is pos-
itive and signi¯cant. The coe±cient on the price of ¯nancial resource (w1) is
signi¯cantly positive (0.858). The coe±cient on the prices of personnel (w2)
was (0.164) and physical capital (w3) are (1-0.858-0.164=-0.022).
5.2 E±ciency Scores
Now, we turn to the mean e±ciency scores that result from the M3 to the
cost and pro¯t frontiers. remember that pro¯t e±ciency scores are in a range
from 0 t 1, where 1 indicates a banks is e±cient and operates on the frontier.
For cost e±ciency, scores lie range from 1 to 1, where an e±cient bank again
has a score of 1. In table (8), we report a few summary statistics on cost and
pro¯t e±ciency scores.
Table (8) shows that individual cost e±ciencies vary from 1.05 to 13.64.
Moreover, the mean of cost e±ciency of 3.62 suggest that most of ¯nancial
institutions have an e±ciency score not close to 1. While to the pro¯t func-
tion, the individual scores vary from 0.41 to 1, suggesting that the most of
banks have scores close to 1. This is consistent with the graphical evidence
in ¯gure (1). The distribution of individual pro¯t e±ciency score is more
uniform and less concentrated than in the case of cost function. In addition,
¯gure (2) provides graphical evidence on the relation between cost and pro¯t
e±ciency scores for individual bank ¯rms. The scatter plot suggests a weak
correlation between both scores. This is con¯rmed by the bilateral correla-
tion coe±cient between two scores 26. It provides evidence in support of our
claim that both cost and pro¯t e±ciency need to be investigated.
26Both, The Spearman rank correlation test and Pearson correlation coe±cient were
0.44 and 0.36 respectively.
24Table 8: Summary E±ciency Statistics a
N Max. Mean Min. SD.
Cost Function
Total System 161 13.64 3.62 1.05 2.15
Commercial Banks 49 6.48 3.62 1.59 1.07
Investment Banks 29 3.33 2.10 1.11 0.44
Specialized Commercial Banks 83 13.64 4.15 1.05 2.69
Pro¯t Function
Total System 161 1.00 0.79 0.41 0.11
Commercial Banks 49 0.98 0.81 0.41 0.13
Investment Banks 29 1.00 0.79 0.55 0.11
Specialized Commercial Banks 83 1.00 0.77 0.50 0.11
a Pro¯t e±ciency scores are in a range from 0 to 1, where 1 indicates
a bank is e±cient and operates on the frontier. For cost e±ciency,
score lie range from 1 to 1, where an e±cient bank again has a score
of 1. The selected model to compute e±ciency scores was the model
3.
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25Table 9: Independent Samples Type of Banks a
Cost E®. Pro¯t E®.
CB IB SCB CB IB SCB
N 49 29 83 49 29 83
Min. 1.59 1.11 1.05 0.41 0.55 0.50
Max. 6.48 3.33 13.64 0.98 1.00 10.00
Mean 3.62 2.10 4.15 0.81 0.79 0.77
S.D. 1.07 0.44 2.69 0.13 0.11 0.11
t-Statistic 7.28 -1.05 0.69 1.89
t-Value b 2.29 -2.27 2.29 2.27
a Pro¯t e±ciency scores are in a range from 0 to 1, where 1 indicates
a bank is e±cient and operates on the frontier. For cost e±ciency,
score lie range from 1 to 1, where an e±cient bank again has a score
of 1. The selected model to compute e±ciency scores was the M3.
b 5% level of signi¯cance.
5.3 Specialization E®ects on E±ciency Scores
In this section we analyze di®erences in cost and pro¯t e±ciency across in-
dividual banks in more detail. To this purpose, we ¯rst distinguish between
di®erent type of ¯nancial institutions. In table (9) we report independently
the e±ciency scores for each type of ¯nancial institutions. In the case of cost
e±ciency scores, the specialized commercial banks presented a higher mean
levels of ine±ciency scores (4.15), while that commercial banks and invest-
ments banks had mean ine±ciency scores levels of 3.62 and 2.10 respectively.
The results in table (9) show that cost e±ciency is marginally higher for
both (IB) and (SCB) with respect to (CB). The t-test show that his di®erence
is statistically signi¯cant. In the case of pro¯t e±ciency, the conclusions are
quite di®erent. The di®erence in mean pro¯t e±ciency was no signi¯cant
comparing comercial banks with the another type of intermediaries. Overall,
out results suggest that di®erentiation between type of bank ¯rms are unable
to exploit their specialization on the pro¯t side. A possible explanation is
the presence of more opportunities of scale economies on the input size than
on output size.
26Figure 3: Cost-Pro¯t E±ciency Trends
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During the period, the trend variables were signi¯cant into the estimations
frontiers for cost and pro¯t functions. Consequently, it is important to ana-
lyze if the mean e±ciency scores has changed, specially, when have identi¯ed
three di®erent subperiods in our sample 27.
Figure (3) reports the time path of mean cost and pro¯t e±ciency for
the years 1989-2003, both weighted by total assets. The ¯gure shows that
weighted mean cost e±ciency is relatively more variable than pro¯t e±ciency
over time. In the crisis period we found a impairment in the mean pro¯t ef-
¯ciency. The evolution after the crises period suggest us that the impact of
the consolidation process are a®ected the ¯nancial intermediaries di®erently
adjusting their cost and pro¯t functions. The mean cost e±ciency for the
period was 20%, while that for alternative pro¯t e±ciency was 80%. Com-
paring the standard deviations, we found that the mean cost (4.6%) e±ciency
was more irregular than mean pro¯t e±ciency (2.8%).
27To save space, the coe±cient estimates for the time varying frontier analysis have been
left out. They are available from the authors upon request.
276 Conclusions
In this paper, we analyzed the cost and pro¯t e±ciency scores to the Colom-
bian ¯nancial system during the period 1989-2003, in which the banking
system has been a®ected by di®erent consolidation, liberation and crises pro-
cess. We used the parametric method of stochastic frontier to estimate cost
and alternative pro¯t functions, using a translog speci¯cation, that includes
¯nancial capital and trend time terms.
Our results show that there are signi¯cant di®erence between cost and
pro¯t estimations. Both Cost and pro¯t functions, must be estimated using
stochastic frontier method. The incorporation of ¯nancial capital was deter-
minant to the frontier estimation in both cases. Furthermore, the inclusion
of trend terms was important to determine the best frontier. The e±ciency
scores presented a higher variance in cost e±ciency than pro¯t e±ciency,
However, pro¯t e±ciency had a more uniform distribution among ¯nancial
intermediaries.
We have o®ered evidence obtained by incorporating capital structure in
the bank production is important to consider banks' risk-taking behavior.
In this way, incorporating ¯nancial capital plays an important role in the
determination on the production e±ciency to the ¯nancial ¯rms and if we
ignore this variable, we can generate bias in the e±ciency estimation.
Analyzing microeconomic duality between minimization cost and maxi-
mization pro¯ts, the results suggest that the empirical data in the period
analyzed, there are not perfect competition in the Colombian banking sys-
tem. The correlation between cost and pro¯t e±ciency scores wasn't high.
For this reason, when we want to analyze e±ciency, we need to use both cost
and pro¯t functions. To our knowledge, this is the ¯rst paper of the e±cien-
cies considering a long period, the ¯rst to compare cost and pro¯t e±ciency
of Colombian ¯nancial intermediaries and the ¯rst using important control
variable such as ¯nancial capital.
Finally, distinguishing by type of ¯nancial intermediaries, we found a
signi¯cant di®erences between commercial banks with the rest of bank ¯rms
in the case of cost function. We ¯nd that whereas all banks appear to perform
rather similarly in terms of pro¯t e±ciency, in terms of cost e±ciency there
are di®erences when we consider e±ciency mean.
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